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Abstract: Cason and Plott (2014) show that subjects’ misconception about the 
incentive properties of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) value elicitation 
procedure can generate data patterns that look like—and might thus be 
misinterpreted as evidence for—preferences constructed from endowments or 
reference points. We test whether game form misconceptions are necessary to 
produce willingness-to-pay (WTP) vs. willingness-to-accept (WTA) gaps in a 
valuation experiment in which subjects are randomly assigned to the role of 
either buyer or seller. We employ a design that allows us to identify whether a 
subject understood the incentive properties of a price-list version of the BDM 
mechanism. We find a robust WTP-WTA gap, even among subjects whose 
elicited valuations for a good of induced and known monetary value and whose 
ability to identify the payoffs resulting from their choices indicate an 
understanding of the incentive properties of the BDM mechanism. We conclude 
that game form misconceptions are not a necessary condition for the emergence 
of WTP-WTA gaps. 
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1. Introduction  
A recent article by Cason and Plott (2014) argues for caution in drawing inferences about non-
standard preferences from choice data using experimental value elicitation procedures, such as 
the mechanism introduced by Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1964, henceforth, BDM). This 
argument raises challenges to parts of the behavioral literature, especially the literature on 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) vs. willingness-to-accept (WTA) gaps—i.e., the tendency for subjects 
endowed with an object to state higher valuation for the object than subjects not endowed with 
it—which is one of the most widely studied phenomena in behavioral economics (see, e.g., 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991; Ericson and Fuster, 2014). 
Cason and Plott support their argument with evidence that a systematic bias in subjects’ 
stated valuations for an item with a known dollar value is reflective of subjects’ 
misunderstanding of the game form—that is, subjects systematically fail to understand the 
incentive properties of the BDM mechanism and therefore over-report their WTA. Specifically, 
Cason and Plott conduct a classroom experiment in which they endow subjects with a card that is 
redeemable from the experimenter for $2, and allow subjects to state sales price offers through 
the BDM procedure. A random posted price between $0 and an upper price limit ranging from $4 
to $8 is generated, and a subject sells his card to the experimenter only if this posted price 
exceeds the subjects’ stated offer price. Using this design, Cason and Plott find that a large 
majority of subjects (83 percent) do not select offers within 5 cents of the dominant strategy of 
$2. This frequency of apparently confused subjects decreases, to 69 percent, with feedback and 
repetition. Moreover, subjects’ offers are biased upward, and are also influenced by the upper 
range of the distribution from which the posted prices are drawn. From this evidence, Cason and 
Plott argue that studies in which researchers attempt to make inferences about preferences from 
experiments using the BDM elicitation procedure should be taken with caution.  
The possibility that game form misconceptions may account for behavior inconsistent 
with standard models of choice in some experiments is intriguing—indeed, this seems to be the 
case in Cason and Plott’s experiment. In this paper, we ask if game form misconceptions are 
necessary to produce such data, or whether WTP-WTA gaps are observed even among subjects 
with no apparent misconceptions about the incentive properties of the BDM.  
To test whether subjects’ misunderstanding of the incentive properties of the BDM 
mechanism is necessary in order to observe WTP-WTA gaps, we follow the recommendation that 
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“experimental procedures should be designed to avoid ‘subject misconceptions’” (Plott and 
Zeiler, 2005). But, we also go further and focus the analysis on those subjects for whom we have 
evidence that there is no misconception. If subject misconceptions about the BDM procedure are 
largely absent, but subjects’ choices nevertheless exhibit significant WTP-WTA gaps, then we 
can exclude that the observed behavior is entirely driven by mistakes in understanding the 
incentive properties of the BDM. 
To address this question, we conduct a valuation experiment in which subjects are 
randomly assigned to the role of either buyer or seller and where we elicit, respectively, subjects’ 
WTP or WTA values. Our experiment consists of two parts. First, in Part I, we elicit buying and 
selling prices for a card worth precisely 8.50 Swiss francs (CHF). We employ a price-list 
representation of the BDM procedure, in which subjects are presented with a series of prices and 
asked, for each price, whether they are willing to trade at that price (Kahneman, Knetsch and 
Thaler, 1990; Murphy, et al., 2010). Part II of the study is identical to Part I, except for exactly 
one difference: in Part II subjects do not trade an object of induced value (a card worth 8.50 
CHF) but an item with private and heterogeneous valuation—a box of chocolates.  
Furthermore, after subjects indicate their choices in each part, but before they can finalize 
their choices, we also require them to identify the actual payoff consequences for each choice 
and, in case they make a mistake, we provide feedback and ask them to correct their mistake. 
Hence, all subjects, at the time of implementing a choice, have correctly entered all of the payoff 
consequences from their choices. Moreover, we can identify those subjects who entered their 
payoffs correctly on the very first attempt.  
These procedures allow us to identify a subset of subjects who satisfy three conditions 
that are likely to mean they understand the BDM mechanism and its payoff consequences. First, 
we consider only subjects who provide payoff-maximizing valuations in Part I, where values are 
common and known. Second, we further eliminate any subjects who do not enter their payoffs 
entirely correctly on their first attempt in Part I. Third, we also eliminate subjects who do not 
enter their payoffs correctly on their first attempt in Part II, when bidding or offering prices for 
the box of chocolates. Hence, what remains are subjects who i) make optimal choices in the 
BDM with known value, ii) identify all payoff consequences correctly in the BDM with known 
value on their first attempt, and iii) identify all payoff consequences correctly in the BDM for the 
box of chocolates on their first attempt. These “sophisticated” subjects are unlikely to have 
misconceptions about the BDM game form.  
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We test whether a WTP-WTA gap for the object of unknown value—the box of 
chocolates—still obtains within this subset of our population. Our main result is that, looking 
only at the subjects with no apparent game form misconception, we nevertheless replicate a 
strong WTP-WTA gap in Part II. Hence, WTP-WTA gaps obtain even among a population for 
which misconception of the incentive properties of the BDM mechanism is likely not an issue.  
However, while we observe that a majority of subjects, 70 percent, provide the payoff-
maximizing valuation in Part I of the experiment, we also observe that 30 percent do not. Hence, 
we confirm the limitations of the BDM as a valuation mechanism observed by Cason and Plott 
(2014), providing support for their claim that caution is warranted when relying on valuations 
elicited with this mechanism due to subject miscomprehension of the incentive properties.  
Before proceeding to our design and results, we note that we do not attempt to provide 
evidence supporting any particular explanation for WTP-WTA gaps. Thus, we make no claims 
that the WTP-WTA gap in our data is driven by loss aversion, or whether it results from other 
behavioral phenomena, such as misperception of the value of a commodity or alternative sources 
of utility or disutility (cf. Plott and Zeiler, 2005 and 2007; Weaver and Frederick, 2012). Instead, 
our simpler goal is to test whether game form misconceptions are a necessary condition to 
produce WTP-WTA gaps, or whether such gaps obtain even when such misconceptions are 
absent. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
Subjects participated in two decision tasks, presented as Parts I and II of the experiment. Part I 
consisted of a BDM value elicitation choice task for an object with fixed and known value. Part II 
consisted of an identical choice task for a good with heterogeneous and unobservable value. 
Subjects were informed that either Part I or Part II would count for their earnings in the study, but 
not both, and that the decisions in one part had no consequences for the respective other part. No 
feedback was given between Part I and Part II.  
At the beginning of the study, subjects were randomized to be in the role of either buyer 
or seller. Randomization took place on the session level; that is, in a given session all subjects 
were either buyers or sellers. At the outset of the study, subjects were informed that they received 
an initial endowment of CHF 25, as a show-up fee. 
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2.1 Part I 
Subjects in a buyer session could buy a “card” from the experimenter. The card was a small piece 
of paper located at the subject’s computer terminal, which stated, “This card is worth 8.50 CHF.” 
If a subject bought the card, he or she could redeem it for 8.50 CHF from the experimenter at the 
end of the study. The BDM mechanism was used to elicit the highest price a subject was willing 
to pay to buy the card. At the end of the study, the computer drew an individually randomized 
price between 0 and 20 CHF, in increments of 1 CHF. Each subject decided, for all possible 21 
prices, whether or not to buy the card at that price. If a subject bought the card, he or she could 
redeem it for 8.50 CHF, but had to pay the price out of the initial endowment of 25 CHF. If the 
subject did not buy the card, he or she could not redeem it, but did not pay the randomly drawn 
price. Subjects entered their choices in a table in which each row corresponded to a possible 
price, by clicking either on a box stating “I buy at this price” or on a box stating “I do not buy at 
this price.”2 Prices were ordered from 0 CHF (top row) to 20 CHF (bottom row). Subjects were 
informed that they should indicate the maximum price they were willing to pay for the card, and 
that they should therefore only have one price at which they switched from buying to not buying, 
as their decisions would otherwise be inconsistent.3 For each possible price, we also displayed the 
payoff consequences of the two possible choices on the corresponding row.  
 Subjects in a seller session were endowed with the card—the instructions explicitly stated 
“The card is yours, you own it.”—but had the option to sell it to the experimenter. They had to 
decide, for each possible price, whether or not to sell the card at that price. If they sold the card, 
they could not redeem it for 8.50 CHF, but received the randomly drawn price, in addition to 
their initial 25 CHF. If they did not sell the card, they could redeem it for 8.50 CHF, in addition 
to their initial 25 CHF, but did not receive the price. Each seller indicated his or her choice in a 
table that was equivalent to the one presented to buyers. For each of the 21 possible prices, a 
seller had to click either on a box stating “I sell at this price” or on a box stating “I do not sell at 
this price.” As with buyers, the software enforced unique switching points and also displayed 
payoff information for the two possible choices in each row. 
 Clearly, with an induced value of 8.50 CHF, payoff-maximizing subjects should buy the 
card for prices of at most 8 CHF and sell it for prices of 9 CHF or higher. Hence, a buyer who 
switches from buying the card at a price of 8 CHF to not buying at a price of 9 CHF or a seller 
                                                            
2 Instructions and choice interfaces are provided in the Online Supplementary Material. 
3 If a subject indicated more than one switching point, the computer would not allow the subject to proceed. 
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who switches from not selling at a price of 8 CHF to selling at a price of 9 CHF is less likely to 
suffer from game form misconception than if they behaved otherwise.  
We also included an additional test of whether subjects understood the incentive 
properties of the BDM mechanism in Part I. After they made their choices for each price and 
clicked an “OK” button to proceed, subjects had to identify the exact payoffs that would result for 
each of the possible 21 prices, given their choice (buy/not buy or sell/not sell) at that price. Panel 
A of Figure 1 provides part of this interface for buyers. Subjects could always alter their choices 
for any of the 21 possible prices by returning from the payoff entry screen to the decision screen 
before confirming their payoff entries. Once subjects were ready to proceed, the computer 
verified whether they had entered all of the resulting payoffs correctly. If a subject entered all 21 
payoffs correctly on the first attempt, given his or her final choices, the subject earned an 
additional 2 CHF. If there was a mistake in any of the payoff entries, the subject was asked to 
identify the resulting payoffs once more. The computer allowed a subject to proceed only once he 
or she entered all payoffs correctly. 
 
Figure 1: Computer Interfaces of the Payoff Entry Screens 
 
Panel A – Part I 
 
Panel B – Part II 
Notes: Screen shots of parts of the payoff entry stages for buyers in Part 1 (shown in Panel A) and Part II 
(shown in Panel B). Subjects’ choices for each price are displayed in grey (in the above example, the subject 
bought at all shown prices). The full screens contain all 21 rows for prices from 0 CHF to 20 CHF. The screens 
for sellers are equivalent. All screens are included in full in the Online Supplementary Material. In Part II the 
payoff entry screen also required subjects to indicate whether or not the final payoff additionally included the 
box of chocolates.  
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2.2 Part II 
Part II of the study was identical to Part I except for exactly one difference: subjects did not trade 
an object of induced value (a card worth 8.50 CHF) but a box of chocolates.4 The box of 
chocolates was purchased from a well-known upmarket Swiss confectionary at a retail price of 17 
CHF, but subjects were not informed about this price.  
As in Part I, subjects in a buyer session could buy the box of chocolates from the 
experimenter. A box was located at each subject’s computer terminal. We used exactly the same 
BDM mechanism as in Part I to elicit a subject’s maximum willingness to pay, with random 
prices between 0 and 20 CHF (individually drawn at the end of the study), in increments of 1 
CHF. The screen that was employed to elicit buying decisions for each possible price 
corresponded exactly to the screen used in Part I. If a subject bought the box, the subject could 
take it home, but had to pay the price out of the initial endowment of 25 CHF. If a subject did not 
buy the box, the subject could not take it home, but did not have to pay the drawn price. A unique 
switching point was enforced by the software, as in Part I. 
Subjects in a seller session were endowed with the box of chocolates but had the option to 
sell it to the experimenter. As in Part I subjects had to decide, for each possible price between 0 
and 20 CHF, whether or not to sell the box of chocolate at that price. If a subject sold the box, he 
or she could not take it home, but received the randomly drawn price, in addition to the initial 25 
CHF. If a subject did not sell the box, he or she could take it home, in addition to the initial 25 
CHF, but did not receive the price. The interface that was employed to elicit selling decisions for 
each possible price corresponded exactly to the screen used in Part I. The software enforced a 
unique switching point. 
As with Part I, subjects again had to identify all possible realized payoffs based on their 
specific choices, before proceeding. Subjects now had to enter their resulting monetary earnings 
and whether they would own or not own the box of chocolates, for each of the possible 21 prices, 
given their choices at that price. Panel B of Figure 1 provides a screen shot of part of the payoff 
entry screen. At that point, subjects had the option to change any of their previous buying or 
selling decisions, and they earned an additional 2 CHF only if they entered all 21 potentially 
                                                            
4 We did not counterbalance the order of the two tasks. Cason and Plott (2014) find that subject misconception about 
the BDM decreases with experience. Therefore, by having the task that we use to measure misconception first, our 
classification of subject comprehension in the second task is conservative. 
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resulting payoffs correctly on the first attempt. The computer allowed a subject to proceed only 
once he or she entered all payoffs correctly. 
An important feature of the experimental design is that using an item of induced value in 
Part I, together with the incentivized calculation of the resulting payoffs in Parts I and II, allows 
us to identify which subjects understand the incentive properties of the BDM mechanism and 
thus to restrict our analysis of Part II behavior to subjects who revealed such understanding of the 
mechanism. Subjects who make payoff-maximizing choices in Part I and identify all of their 
payoffs correctly in Parts I and II, on the first attempt, presumably hold very little misconception 
about the BDM procedure. Hence, for these subjects, we assume that elicited valuations in Part II 
for the box of chocolate are unlikely to be biased by game form misconception. 
 
2.3 Additional Measurements 
After subjects completed Part II, we administered two measures of cognitive ability: a Cognitive 
Reflection Test (Frederic, 2005) and a computerized 12-item Raven Progressive Matrices test 
(Raven et al., 1998). Subjects received additional 0.50 CHF for each correctly solved puzzle in 
the Raven test. 
 
2.4 Methodological Note: Highly Replicable Laboratory Environment 
Our design also employs a novel procedure that allows high degrees of replicability across 
experimental sessions and, in principle, across experimental laboratories. Specifically, subjects 
received instructions both through printed instructions at their desk and through an audio 
recording played via loudspeaker in the laboratory.5 Hence, the key elements of our experimental 
environment can be reliably replicated across sessions in our laboratory or elsewhere. We 
consider this enhanced replicability important for at least two reasons. First, the use of pre-
recorded audio files to deliver instructions ensures that these are delivered in exactly the same 
manner across multiple sessions and by a speaker unaware of the experimental hypotheses. 
Second, it lowers the barriers to direct replication, since a researcher at any point in the future has 
a clearer understanding of the precise laboratory environment and the ability to replicate it more 
closely. Indeed, a researcher need only distribute paper instructions, play the audio files, and start 
the experimental software to conduct a session virtually identical to the ones in this study. 
                                                            
5 Prior to conducting the experiment, we contracted a professional voice artist (hired through fiverr.com) to record 
audio files of the instructions. The audio files, along with other experimental program files, are provided in the 
Online Supplementary Material. 
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2.5 Information on Sessions, Subjects, and Earnings 
We conducted four sessions on two consecutive days in November 2014, with 140 subjects in 
total. On each day, we conducted one buyer session and one seller session. The order of the buyer 
and seller sessions was reversed on the second day. Overall, 69 subjects participated in the role of 
buyer and 71 subjects in the role of seller.  
All sessions took place at the Laboratory for Behavioral and Experimental Economics of 
the Department of Economics at the University of Zurich. The experiments were run with the 
software “z-Tree” (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were students from the University of Zurich and 
the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich We used the software “hroot” (Bock et al., 
2014) for recruitment.6 Each subject participated only once, either as seller or buyer.7 Sessions 
lasted about 75 minutes. On average, subjects earned CHF 36.22, which includes a show-up fee 
of CHF 25. In addition, 19 of our subjects also took home a box of chocolates. 
 
3. Results 
We start by analyzing the decisions of buyers and sellers in Part I. Buyers and sellers indicated, 
respectively, their maximum WTP and minimum WTA for a card worth 8.50 CHF. If subjects 
simply seek to maximize monetary earnings, then subjects’ true WTP and WTA for this card 
should both be 8.50 CHF. Our price-list design does not allow us to observe valuations with high 
precision. What we can identify is that, for instance, a buyer who is willing to pay ܺ but not 
ܺ ൅ 1 must have a valuation in the interval, WTP ∈ ሾܺ, ܺ ൅ 1ሻ. Similarly, a seller who is willing 
to accept ܺ ൅ 1 but not	ܺ must have a valuation in the interval, WTA ∈ ሺܺ, ܺ ൅ 1ሿ. Therefore, in 
our analysis, we use the mid-point of the two values between which a buyer switches from 
buying to not buying or a seller switches from not selling to selling, ሺܺ ൅ ܺ ൅ 1ሻ 2⁄ , as our 
estimate of the WTA or WTP value for that subject.8  
                                                            
6 The study was conducted in English. One subject in the role of seller had to be excused from the study due to a lack 
of fluency in English. The analysis thus comprises 139 subjects in total. 
7 Our subjects generally had little prior experience with laboratory experiments. On average, they had participated in 
0.94 experiments in our lab prior to our study, with a median of 0. Of those who had prior experience with laboratory 
experiments, only nine subjects had participated in experiments that were labeled (in our recruiting software) as 
“simple value-based choice tasks.” Thus, it is unlikely that many of our subjects had prior exposure to the BDM 
mechanism or WTP-WTA type experiments. 
8 If a subject chose a corner solution, i.e. chose to buy or sell at any or at no price in the list, we use the respective 
boundary of the price list as WTP or WTA. For example, if a subject chose not to sell the box of chocolate at any 
price, then we assign a WTA of 20 for that subject. In total, 2 subjects made such choices. 
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Overall, 98 of 139 subjects (70.5 percent) made choices consistent with WTA and WTP 
values of 8.50 CHF. More precisely, 53 out of 69 subjects (76.8 percent) in the buyer condition 
switched from buying to not buying between 8 and 9 CHF and 45 out of 70 subjects (63.4 
percent) in the seller condition switched from not selling to selling in the same interval.  
The mean estimates of WTP and WTA for the card are 8.43 CHF and 9.01 CHF, 
respectively. These values are also provided in the first column of Table 1. The left panel of 
Figure 2 presents the cumulative frequencies of estimated WTP and WTA values. The two 
frequencies overlap considerably, indicating little difference between the estimated valuations for 
buyers and sellers for the card with known value of 8.50 CHF. Consistent with the differences in 
means, there are slightly more high value estimates for the sellers than for buyers. However, the 
two means and the two distributions do not differ significantly (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, 
p=0.219; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p=0.698).  
 
Table 1: WTP-WTA Gaps 
 Card (all subjects) 
Chocolate 
(all subjects) 
Chocolate 
(sophisticated) 
Chocolate 
(confused) 
p-value 
(sophisticated 
vs. confused) 
WTP 
(Buyer) 
8.43 
(0.191, 
N=69) 
 
4.78 
(0.377, 
N=69) 
 
4.63 
(0.468,  
N=41) 
 
5.00 
(0.635, 
N=28) 
 
0.711 
WTA 
(Seller) 
9.01 
(0.276, 
N=70) 
8.62 
(0.612, 
N=70) 
7.65 
(0.765,  
N=40) 
9.91 
(0.962, 
N=30) 
0.054 
p-value 
(WTP vs. 
WTA) 
0.219 0.000 0.005 0.000  
 
Notes: Mean estimated WTP and WTA in CHF. Numbers in brackets are standard errors and number of 
subjects. P-values are from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. 
 
In both conditions, we observe underpaying as well as overpaying. Of the 16 buyers with 
estimated WTP other than 8.50 CHF, exactly 8 underpaid and 8 overpaid for the card. In the 
seller condition, 9 subjects yielded WTA estimate values below 8.50 CHF and 16 gave values 
greater than 8.50 CHF. However, neither of these proportions differs significantly from 50% 
(two-sided binomial test: p=1 and p=0.230, respectively).  
These findings demonstrate, firstly, that our price-list version of the BDM procedure for 
eliciting WTP and WTA resulted in fewer deviations from the optimum than the stated-price 
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version in Cason and Plott (2014). They find that only 41 out of 245 (16.7 %) of their subjects 
chose the payoff maximizing WTA.9 Secondly, we find that deviations are relatively balanced 
and thus do not indicate that our implementation of the BDM mechanism leads subjects to exhibit 
a clear systematic bias in the sense of stating either too high or too low WTP or WTA values, 
respectively. 
 
Result 1: Overall, 98 out of 139 subjects provided choices that maximized their monetary 
payoffs in the valuation task for the object with known value. For those subjects who did not do 
so, we find little evidence of systematic mistakes in one direction or of differences between buyers 
and sellers. 
 
After subjects indicated their WTP or WTA in Part I, we asked them to identify, for every 
possible random price realization, their final payoff given their choice at that price. Overall, 54 
out of 69 buyers (78.3 percent) and 58 out of 70 sellers (82.9 percent) correctly provided their 
final payoffs for every possible price on the first attempt. Hence, this second measurement tool 
shows that on aggregate, 80.6 percent of subjects indicated good understanding of the payoff 
implications of their choices.10 
 
                                                            
9 Given that we use a price-list version of the BDM with increments of 1 CHF, we cannot rule out that we classify a 
subject who switched between 8 and 9 CHF as behaving consistently with a valuation of 8.50 CHF even though this 
subject would have stated a switching point other than exactly 8.50 CHF in a stated-price version of the BDM 
mechanism. Strictly speaking we thus interpret choices within 0.50 CHF from the real price of 8.50 CHF as 
consistent with payoff-maximizing behavior. (Note, however, that subjects whom we later classify as “sophisticated” 
also had to identify the payoff consequences of their choices and we did not allow for any error margin in this 
respect.) Cason and Plott (2014) employ a narrower tolerance interval, of plus or minus $0.05 from the real value of 
$2, for their classification of payoff-maximizing behavior. However, this difference in size of the intervals does not 
account for the higher fraction of “confused” subjects in their study. Applying a $0.50 interval to Cason and Plott’s 
data (available online) only increases conformance with payoff maximization to 23.27 percent. 
10 Out of those 53 buyers with estimated WTP of 8.50 CHF, 43 correctly identified all the final payoffs on the first 
try and so did 11 out of the 16 buyers with estimated WTP different from 8.50 CHF. Out of those 45 sellers with 
estimated WTA of 8.50 CHF, 40 correctly identified all the final payoffs on the first try and so did 18 out of 25 with 
estimated WTA different from 8.50 CHF. Therefore, for both buyers and sellers, the proportion of those who 
correctly entered their final payoff on the first try is higher for subjects who made the payoff maximizing choice 
(81.1 percent vs 68.8 percent and 88.9 percent vs. 72 percent, respectively). 
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution functions of WTP and WTA estimates in Part I (Card) and 
Part II (Chocolate). 
 
In Part II, subjects indicated their WTP and WTA for a box of chocolates. We again 
obtain WTP and WTA estimates for each subject by taking the midpoint of the prices at which a 
subject switched from buying to not buying or from not selling to selling. Taking all subjects into 
account, the mean WTA for the box of chocolates was significantly higher than the WTP (4.78 
CHF vs. 8.62 CHF; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p<0.01). Hence, taking into account all subjects, our 
study replicates the common finding of a substantial WTP-WTA gap.  
However, our main research question is whether the gap remains if we consider only 
those subjects whose choices indicate that they understood the incentive properties of the BDM 
mechanism. To see whether heterogeneity in subject misconceptions can account for the WTP-
WTA gap in Part II, we separately identify “sophisticated” subjects who appear to understand the 
incentive properties of the BDM mechanism. This group consists of those subjects who chose the 
payoff maximizing switching point in Part I (between prices of 8 and 9 CHF) and who correctly 
identified the final payoffs for all possible prices on their first attempts in both Part I and Part II. 
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Hence, this group, which consists of 41 buyers and 40 sellers,11 or 58.3 percent of our total 
sample, satisfies fairly strong requirements for being classified as understanding the incentive 
properties of the BDM mechanism. This group did not only make the payoff-maximizing choice 
in the Part I valuation task—which is Cason and Plott’s test for BDM game-form 
sophistication—but also provided two sets of 21 correct payoff entries, each on their first attempt.  
The remaining group, which we label “confused,” comprises subjects who failed at least 
one of the three conditions. Hence, this group either made dominated choices in Part I, or made at 
least one mistake in one of the two sets of payoff entries. 
A closer look at the composition of the two groups reveals that those subjects who score 
higher on two measures of cognitive ability—the Raven Progressive Matrices test and the 
Cognitive Reflection Test—are significantly more likely to be “sophisticated;” see Models (1) 
and (2) in Table 2, respectively. Model (3) reveals that only the Raven Progressive Matrices test 
remains significant when we consider both tests simultaneously. Hence, by at least one measure, 
subjects in the “sophisticated” group are smarter on average, which lends further support to the 
notion that those subjects understood the BDM mechanism correctly.  
 
Table 2: Probit regressions 
Dependent variable:  
“Sophistication”  (1) (2) (3) 
Raven test score 0.072*** (0.023)  
0.065*** 
(0.025) 
CRT score  0.085** (0.039) 
0.028  
(0.043) 
Observations 139 139 139 
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.026 0.061 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable taking on value 1 if a subject is categorized 
as “sophisticated” and 0 otherwise. Raven test score denotes the number of correctly solved 
puzzles (out of 12). CRT score measures the number of correct answers in the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (out of 3). The coefficients report marginal effects from a probit regression 
calculated at the mean. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
*** denote significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent.
 
 As Table 1 reveals, there is no difference in WTP estimates and a marginally significant 
difference in WTA estimates for the box of chocolate between the sophisticated and confused 
subjects (WTP(sophisticated) = 4.63 CHF vs. WTP(confused) = 5.00 CHF, Wilcoxon rank-sum 
                                                            
11 Only 1 out of 70 sellers and 3 out of 69 buyers incorrectly entered their final payoffs in Part II on their first 
attempt. 
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test, p=0.711; WTA(sophisticated) = 7.65 CHF vs. WTA(confused) = 9.91 CHF, Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, p=0.054).12 Furthermore, the distributions of estimated WTP and WTA values are 
similar for the two groups and do not differ significantly (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p=1.000 
and p=0.451, respectively).13   
Finally, and most importantly for the research question addressed in this paper, WTA 
estimates are significantly greater than WTP estimates, even when we only consider sophisticated 
subjects (4.63 CHF vs 7.64 CHF, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.005). This difference is also 
evident when comparing the distributions in the right panel of Figure 1 (Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test, p=0.010). Hence, we have our main result: WTP-WTA gaps persist even in the absence of 
game form misconceptions.  
 
Result 2: Estimated WTA for a box of chocolates is significantly higher than estimated 
WTP for the same box of chocolates. This result holds even for subjects who revealed a high level 
of understanding of the incentive properties of the BDM mechanism.  
 
4. Conclusion 
We follow up on the claim by Cason and Plott (2014) that “the failure of game form recognition 
can masquerade as support for the theory of framing, such as preferences constructed from 
reference points.” They support this claim by showing that a BDM value elicitation experiment in 
which there is a lot of misconception can produce data that could be misinterpreted as reflecting 
support for a non-standard preference  theory of framing or endowments, while the behavioral 
patterns in the data merely reflect subjects’ game form misconception. While this claim might be 
true in some data sets, such as the one collected by Cason and Plott, they leave unanswered the 
important question whether such behavioral patterns persist for subjects who do not suffer from 
game form misconceptions. That is, they leave open the question of whether subject 
misconception is necessary to produce such behavioral effects. 
                                                            
12 We find a similar pattern in Part I where there is no difference in WTP estimates and a marginally significant 
difference in WTA estimates between sophisticated and confused subjects (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p=1.000 and 
p=0.052, respectively). 
13 We find no significant relation when we regress, separately and jointly, the WTA of sellers or the WTP of buyers 
in Part II on the subjects’ Raven test or CRT scores. However, the coefficients for the effects on the WTA are both 
negative and not close to zero, which suggests that subjects who score higher on these tests tend to state somewhat 
lower WTA values. The coefficients for the effects on the WTP show no such relationship; they are very close to 
zero and differ in signs. 
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In our paper, we employ a design that allows us to identify whether subjects comprehend 
the incentive properties of a price-list version of the BDM mechanism. Our main result is that the 
WTP-WTA gap in a standard valuation task persists for subjects who revealed their 
understanding of the game form of the BDM mechanism. We can thus conclude that game form 
misconceptions are not a necessary condition for the emergence of a WTP-WTA gap.14 
Finally, our study also provides some evidence that supports Cason and Plott’s argument 
that researchers must be careful when using the BDM mechanism. We, too, found a non-trivial 
proportion of subjects, about 30 percent, that make sub-optimal choices when stating valuations 
for a good with known value—even though we used procedures intended to minimize confusion 
regarding the mechanism. Furthermore, we find some evidence that supports Cason and Plott’s 
claim that confusion can lead subjects to display behavior that appears consistent with framing 
effects. First, while the proportion of overpaying to underpaying buyers in Part I is perfectly 
balanced, it is not so for sellers—more sellers overpaid than underpaid in Part I. This latter 
difference could be misinterpreted as evidence of framing effects, though it is not statistically 
significant in our data. Second, sellers who we classified as “confused” stated, on average, a 
marginally significantly higher WTA than “sophisticated” sellers in both Parts I and II. This 
biases the data in the direction of what is commonly interpreted as a framing or endowment 
effect, by increasing the WTP-WTA gap. However, for buyers in Part II the opposite holds. 
“Confused” buyers stated, on average, a higher WTP than “sophisticated” buyers. This goes in 
the opposite direction of misconceptions masquerading as typical framing effects, though the 
difference is not statistically significant.  
Overall, our results do not contradict Cason and Plott’s argument that misconceptions can 
lead to data that looks consistent with and might thus be misinterpreted as evidence for non-
standard preferences. However, we demonstrate that a large and significant WTP-WTA gap 
remains even absent any evidence of subject misconceptions.  
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A.1 Instructions for Buyers 
 
Instructions for Participants 
 
 
 
Welcome to this study. 
 
Please read through the following instructions, while they are read aloud. They explain 
everything you need to know for participating in the study. If you have any questions after 
listening to the instructions, please raise your hand and wait. We will then come to you and 
answer them. 
 
During the study, speaking with the other participants and the use of mobile phones are 
forbidden. Violation of these rules will lead to exclusion from the study and loss of all associated 
payments. 
 
 
The Study 
 
You begin the study with an endowment of 25 CHF. During the study, the amount of money you 
have may vary, based on your decisions. Whatever final amount you end up with will be paid to 
you in cash at the end of the study. 
 
In this study you will make two decisions; one in Part I, and one in Part II. You will first receive 
instructions for Part I and will make your decision for Part I. You will then receive instructions 
and make your decision for Part II. The decision you make in one part will have no effect on 
anything that happens in the other part.  
 
At the end of the study, one of the two parts will be randomly drawn with equal probability to be 
the only part that counts for determining your payment. The part that is not selected to count will 
have no effect on your earnings. That is, either Part I or Part II, but not both, will determine your 
entire earnings for the study. 
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Part I 
 
In Part I you have the option to buy a card worth 8.5 CHF. The card is located in front of you at 
your computer terminal. If you buy the card, you can redeem it for 8.5 CHF from the 
experimenter at the end of the study.  
 
Your task in Part I is to indicate the highest price you are willing to pay to buy the card.  
 
At the end of the study, the computer will randomly draw a price between 0 and 20 CHF, in 
increments of 1 CHF. This will be the price at which you can buy the card. You will not know the 
actual price until the end of the study. 
 
You will decide, for each possible price, whether to buy or not buy the card at that price. 
• If you buy the card, you can redeem it for 8.5 CHF, but you have to pay the price out of 
your initial 25 CHF.  
• If you do not buy the card, you cannot redeem it for 8.5 CHF, but you do not have to pay 
any price out of your initial 25 CHF.  
 
You will make your buying decision on a screen that looks like the table below. Please take a 
moment to look at this table. 
 
Final Payoff  
(25 CHF – price 
+ value of card) 
I buy at this 
price 
Price 
(one row randomly 
selected to count) 
I do not buy 
at this price 
Final Payoff 
(25 CHF) 
33.5 CHF □ 0 CHF □ 25 CHF 
32.5 CHF □ 1 CHF □ 25 CHF 
31.5 CHF □ 2 CHF □ 25 CHF 
… … … … ... 
26.5 CHF □ 7 CHF □ 25 CHF 
25.5 CHF □ 8 CHF □ 25 CHF 
24.5 CHF □ 9 CHF □ 25 CHF 
… … … … … 
15.5 CHF □ 18 CHF □ 25 CHF 
14.5 CHF □ 19 CHF □ 25 CHF 
13.5 CHF □ 20 CHF □ 25 CHF 
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Each row in the table corresponds to one of the possible prices. The prices are indicated in the 
middle column of the table, in bold. Remember that the computer will randomly select one price 
to count. Your choice in this row, if Part I is selected to count, will determine your payoff from 
the study.  
 
You will choose, for each possible row, whether to buy or not buy the card at the price given in 
that row. You will indicate your choice in each row, by clicking the box on the left if you choose 
to buy at that price and the box on the right if you choose not to buy at that price. 
 
The final payoff that you receive from buying at a given price is shown in the left column and the 
final payoff from not buying at a given price is shown in the right column. 
 
Examples: 
• Suppose you indicate that you want to buy the card at a price of 2 CHF (by checking the 
left box in that line) and the price of 2 CHF is randomly drawn, then your payoff would 
be 31.5 CHF (25 CHF – 2 CHF + 8.5 CHF). If, instead, you indicate not to buy the card 
at a price of 2 CHF, your payoff would be 25 CHF. 
• Suppose you indicate that you want to buy the card at a price of 18 CHF and the price of 
18 CHF is randomly drawn, then your payoff would be 15.5 CHF (25 CHF – 18 CHF + 
8.5 CHF). If, instead, you indicate not to buy the card at a price of 18 CHF, your payoff 
would be 25 CHF. 
 
Remember that we are asking you for the highest price at which you are willing to buy the card. 
This means that you should select “buy” for all of the rows that correspond to prices below the 
highest price you are willing to pay, and should select “do not buy” for all the rows that 
correspond to prices above the highest price you are willing to pay. The computer will not allow 
you to make inconsistent choices in which you indicate not to buy the card at some price, but 
then indicate to buy it at a higher price. That is, there should be only one price at which you 
switch from buying the card to not buying the card. 
 
Remember that there is a 50 percent chance that Part I will be selected to determine all your 
earnings for the study. Therefore, please think carefully about your decision. 
 
Are there any questions about Part I, before we proceed to the decision screen? If you have a 
question, please raise your hand and wait for an experimenter. 
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Part II 
 
In Part II you have the option to buy a box of chocolate. The box is located in front of you at 
your computer terminal. If you buy the box, you can take it home with you at the end of the 
study. 
 
Your task in Part II is to indicate the highest price you are willing to pay to buy the box of 
chocolate.  
 
At the end of the study, the computer will randomly draw a price between 0 and 20 CHF, in 
increments of 1 CHF. This will be the price at which you can buy the box of chocolates. You will 
not know the actual price until the end of the study. 
 
You will decide, for each possible price, whether to buy or not buy the box of chocolate at that 
price. 
• If you buy the box of chocolate, you can take it home, but you have to pay the price out of 
your initial 25 CHF.  
• If you do not buy the box of chocolate, you cannot take it home, but you do not have to 
pay any price out of your initial 25 CHF.  
You will make your buying decision on a screen that looks like the table below. Please take a 
moment to look at this table. 
 
Final Payoff  
(25 CHF – price + 
box of chocolate) 
I buy at 
this price 
Price 
(one row randomly 
selected to count) 
I do not buy 
at this price 
Final Payoff 
(25 CHF) 
25 CHF + chocolate □ 0 CHF □ 25 CHF 
24 CHF + chocolate □ 1 CHF □ 25 CHF 
23 CHF + chocolate □ 2 CHF □ 25 CHF 
… … … … … 
18 CHF + chocolate □ 7 CHF □ 25 CHF 
17 CHF + chocolate □ 8 CHF □ 25 CHF 
16 CHF + chocolate □ 9 CHF □ 25 CHF 
… … … … … 
7 CHF + chocolate □ 18 CHF □ 25 CHF 
6 CHF + chocolate □ 19 CHF □ 25 CHF 
5 CHF + chocolate □ 20 CHF □ 25 CHF 
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Each row in the table corresponds to one of the possible prices. The prices are indicated in the 
middle column of the table, in bold. Remember that the computer will randomly select one price 
to count. Your choice in this row, if Part II is selected to count, will determine your payoff from 
the study.  
 
You will choose, for each possible row, whether to buy or not buy the box of chocolate at the 
price given in that row. You will indicate your choice in each row, by clicking the box on the left 
if you choose to buy at that price and the box on the right if you choose not to buy at that price. 
 
The final payoff that you receive from buying at a given price is shown in the left column and the 
final payoff from not buying at a given price is shown in the right column. 
 
Examples: 
• Suppose you indicate that you want to buy the box of chocolate at a price of 2 CHF (by 
checking the left box in that line) and the price of 2 CHF is randomly drawn, then your 
payoff would be 23 CHF (25 CHF – 2 CHF) plus the box of chocolate. If, instead, you 
indicate not to buy the box of chocolate at a price of 2 CHF, your payoff would be 25 
CHF. 
• Suppose you indicate that you want to buy the box of chocolate at a price of 18 CHF and 
the price of 18 CHF is randomly drawn, then your payoff would be 7 CHF (25 CHF – 18 
CHF) plus the box of chocolate. If, instead, you indicate not to buy the box of chocolate at 
a price of 18 CHF, your payoff would be 25 CHF. 
 
Remember that we are asking you for the highest price at which you are willing to buy the box 
of chocolate. This means that you should select “buy” for all of the rows that correspond to prices 
below the highest price you are willing to pay, and should select “do not buy” for all the rows 
that correspond to prices above the highest price you are willing to pay. The computer will not 
allow you to make inconsistent choices in which you indicate not to buy the box of chocolate at 
some price, but then indicate to buy it at a higher price. That is, there should only be one price at 
which you switch from buying the box of chocolate to not buying the box of chocolate. 
 
Remember that there is a 50 percent chance that Part II will be selected to determine all your 
earnings for the study. Therefore, please think carefully about your decision. 
 
Are there any questions about Part II, before we proceed to the decision screen? If you have a 
question, please raise your hand and wait for an experimenter.  
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A.2 Decision screens for Buyers 
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B.1 Instructions for Sellers  
 
Instructions for Participants 
 
 
 
Welcome to this study. 
 
Please read through the following instructions, while they are read aloud. They explain 
everything you need to know for participating in the study. If you have any questions after 
listening to the instructions, please raise your hand and wait. We will then come to you and 
answer them. 
 
During the study, speaking with the other participants and the use of mobile phones are 
forbidden. Violation of these rules will lead to exclusion from the study and loss of all associated 
payments. 
 
 
The Study 
 
You begin the study with an endowment of 25 CHF. During the study, the amount of money you 
have may vary, based on your decisions. Whatever final amount you end up with will be paid to 
you in cash at the end of the study. 
 
In this study you will make two decisions; one in Part I, and one in Part II. You will first receive 
instructions for Part I and will make your decision for Part I. You will then receive instructions 
and make your decision for Part II. The decision you make in one part will have no effect on 
anything that happens in the other part. 
 
At the end of the study, one of the two parts will randomly be drawn with equal probability to be 
the only part that counts for determining your payment. The part that is not selected to count will 
have no effect on your earnings. That is, either Part I or Part II, but not both, will determine your 
entire earnings for the study. 
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Part I 
 
In Part I you have the option to sell a card worth 8.5 CHF. The card is located in front of you at 
your computer terminal. The card is yours, you own it. If you do not sell the card, you can 
redeem it for 8.5 CHF from the experimenter at the end of the study.  
 
Your task in Part I is to indicate the lowest price you are willing to accept to sell the card.  
 
At the end of the study, the computer will randomly draw a price between 0 and 20 CHF, in 
increments of 1 CHF. This will be the price at which you can sell the card. You will not know the 
actual price until the end of the study. 
 
You will decide, for each possible price, whether to sell or not sell the card at that price. 
• If you sell the card, you cannot redeem it for 8.5 CHF, but you receive the price, in 
addition to your initial 25 CHF.  
• If you do not sell the card, you can redeem it for 8.5 CHF, in addition to your initial 25 
CHF, but you do not receive the price.  
 
You will make your buying decision on a screen that looks like the table below. Please take a 
moment to look at this table. 
 
Final Payoff  
(CHF 25 + price) 
I sell at 
this price 
Price 
(one row randomly 
selected to count) 
I do not sell 
at this price 
Final Payoff 
(CHF 25 + 
value of card) 
25 CHF □ 0 CHF □ 33.5 CHF 
26 CHF □ 1 CHF □ 33.5 CHF 
27 CHF □ 2 CHF □ 33.5 CHF 
… … … … … 
32 CHF □ 7 CHF □ 33.5 CHF 
33 CHF □ 8 CHF □ 33.5 CHF 
34 CHF □ 9 CHF □ 33.5 CHF 
… … … … … 
43 CHF □ 18 CHF □ 33.5 CHF 
44 CHF □ 19 CHF □ 33.5 CHF 
45 CHF □ 20 CHF □ 33.5 CHF 
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Each row in the table corresponds to one of the possible prices. The prices are indicated in the 
middle column of the table, in bold. Remember that the computer will randomly select one price 
to count. Your choice in this row, if Part I is selected to count, will determine your payoff from 
the study.  
 
You will choose, for each possible row, whether to sell or not sell the card at the price given in 
that row. You will indicate your choice in each row, by clicking the box on the left if you choose 
to sell at that price and the box on the right if you choose not to sell at that price. 
 
The final payoff that you receive from selling at a given price is shown in the left column and the 
final payoff from not selling at a given price is shown in the right column. 
 
Examples: 
• Suppose you indicate that you want to sell the card at a price of 2 CHF (by checking the 
left box in that line) and the price of 2 CHF is randomly drawn, then your payoff would 
be 27 CHF (25 CHF + 2 CHF). If, instead, you indicate not to sell the card at a price of 2 
CHF, your payoff would be 33.5 CHF (25 CHF + 8.5 CHF). 
• Suppose you indicate that you want to sell the card at a price of 18 CHF and the price of 
18 CHF is randomly drawn, then your payoff would be 43 CHF (25 CHF + 18 CHF). If, 
instead, you indicate not to sell the card at a price of 18 CHF, your payoff would be 33.5 
CHF (25 CHF + 8.5 CHF). 
 
Remember that we are asking you for the lowest price at which you are willing to sell the card. 
This means that you should select “sell” for all of the rows that correspond to prices above the 
lowest price you are willing to accept, and should select “do not sell” for all the rows that 
correspond to prices below the lowest price you are willing to accept. The computer will not 
allow you to make inconsistent choices in which you indicate to sell the card at some price, but 
then indicate not to sell it at a higher price. That is, there should only be one price at which you 
switch from not selling the card to selling the card. 
 
Remember that there is a 50 percent chance that Part I will be selected to determine all your 
earnings for the study. Therefore, please think carefully about your decision. 
 
Are there any questions about Part I, before we proceed to the decision screen? If you have a 
question, please raise your hand and wait for an experimenter. 
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Part II 
 
In Part II you have the option to sell a box of chocolate. The box is located in front of you at 
your computer terminal. The box is yours, you own it. If you do not sell the box, you can take it 
home with you at the end of the study.  
 
Your task in Part II is to indicate the lowest price you are willing to accept to sell the box of 
chocolate.  
 
At the end of the study, the computer will randomly draw a price between 0 and 20 CHF, in 
increments of 1 CHF. This will be price at which you can sell the box of chocolate. You will not 
know the actual price until the end of the study. 
 
You will decide, for each possible price, whether to sell or not sell the box of chocolate at that 
price. 
• If you sell the box of chocolate, you cannot take it home, but you receive the price in 
addition to your initial 25 CHF.  
• If you do not sell the box of chocolate, you can take it home, in addition to your initial 25 
CHF, but you do not receive the price.  
You will make your selling decision on a screen that looks like the table below. Please take a 
moment to look at this table. 
 
Final Payoff  
(CHF 25 + price) 
I sell at 
this price 
Price 
(one row randomly 
selected to count) 
I do not sell 
at this price 
Final Payoff 
(CHF 25 + chocolate) 
25 CHF □ 0 CHF □ 25 CHF + chocolate 
26 CHF □ 1 CHF □ 25 CHF + chocolate 
27 CHF □ 2 CHF □ 25 CHF + chocolate 
 □  □  
32 CHF □ 7 CHF □ 25 CHF + chocolate 
33 CHF □ 8 CHF □ 25 CHF + chocolate 
34 CHF □ 9 CHF □ 25 CHF + chocolate 
 □  □  
43 CHF □ 18 CHF □ 25 CHF + chocolate 
44 CHF □ 19 CHF □ 25 CHF + chocolate 
45 CHF □ 20 CHF □ 25 CHF + chocolate 
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Each row in the table corresponds to one of the possible prices. The prices are indicated in the 
middle column of the table, in bold. Remember that the computer will randomly select one price 
to count. Your choice in this row, if Part II is selected to count, will determine your payoff from 
the study.  
 
You will choose, for each possible row, whether to sell or not sell the box of chocolate at the 
price given in that row. You will indicate your choice in each row, by clicking the box on the left 
if you choose to sell at that price and the box on the right if you choose not to sell at that price. 
 
The final payoff that you receive from selling at a given price is shown in the left column and the 
final payoff from not selling at a given price is shown in the right column. 
 
Examples: 
• Suppose you indicate that you want to sell the box of chocolate at a price of 2 CHF (by 
checking the left box in that line) and the price of 2 CHF is randomly drawn, then your 
payoff would be 27 CHF (25 CHF + 2 CHF). If, instead, you indicate not to sell the box 
of chocolate at a price of 2 CHF, your payoff would be CHF 25 plus the box of chocolate. 
• Suppose you indicate that you want to sell the box of chocolate at a price of 18 CHF and 
the price of 18 CHF is randomly drawn, then your payoff would be 43 CHF (25 CHF + 
18 CHF). If, instead, you indicate not to sell the box of chocolate at a price of 18 CHF, 
your payoff would be CHF 25 plus the box of chocolate. 
 
Remember that we are asking you for the lowest price at which you are willing to sell the box of 
chocolate. This means that you should select “sell” for all of the rows that correspond to prices 
above the lowest price you are willing to accept, and should select “do not sell” for all the rows 
that correspond to prices below the lowest price you are willing to accept. The computer will not 
allow you to make inconsistent choices in which you indicate to sell the box of chocolate at some 
price, but then indicate not to sell it at a higher price. That is, there should only be one price at 
which you switch from not selling the box of chocolate to selling the box of chocolate. 
 
Remember that there is a 50 percent chance that Part II will be selected to determine all your 
earnings for the study. Therefore, please think carefully about your decision. 
 
Are there any questions about Part II, before we proceed to the decision screen? If you have a 
question, please raise your hand and wait for an experimenter. 
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B.2 Decision screens for Sellers  
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C Consent form  
 
 
Seite 1/1 
Department of Economics 
 
University of Zurich 
Blümlisalpstrasse 10 
CH-8006 Zürich 
Telefax +41 (0)44 634 49 07 
www.econ.uzh.ch 
 
Informed consent 
 
 
 
Attendance confirmation:  
Lab experiment at Blümlisalpstrasse 10, Zurich / Econ Lab 
 
You will work on a computer while making decisions to a given set up. 
Furthermore you will be paid for the participation. The payment will be handed out at the end of the study.  
 
There is no risk involved by participating in this study. 
 
Your participation in this study is purely voluntary, and you may withdraw your participation or your data 
at any time without any penalty to you. There will be no pay off if you decide to withdraw your 
participation.  
 
Your data will be kept completely confidential by not recording your name in combination with your data.  
When the research is completed, the data that is kept does not include personal information, only 
choices are kept.  
 
If you have any question regarding this study, do not hesitate to ask the experimenter. If questions arise 
at a later stage, please use the contact details below. 
 
I confirm that I have read the form above and I give my consent to participate. 
 
Signature: ____________________________________ 
 
Name:  ____________________________________ 
 
Prename: ____________________________________ 
 
Date:  ____________________________________ 
 
 
Contact: 
Cornelia Schnyder, Department of Economics, University of Zurich 
Email: cornelia.schnyder@econ.uzh.ch 
www.econ.uzh.ch 
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